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It's not easy to teach constitutional law. In the first part of the
course, where the justifications for and the problems with judicial
review are established, the arguments make some sense and the
subject has some shape. The painful part begins with the examina-
tion of the actual case law of the United States Supreme'Court. In
area after area this requires explication of elaborate "tests" the
Court has developed for deciding whether or not some challenged
action is consistent with some part of the Constitution.
These tests have the appearance of precision and logic. Once
mastered, they need only be applied to the particular activity at
issue. If a state has treated children of married and unmarried
women differently in distributing some public benefit, we apply the
test for discrimination based on parental marital status or "illegiti-
macy." We ask whether the state's distinction is substantially re-
lated to the achievement of a proper governmental interest.' If so,
the state's action is valid. If not, it violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If a state has put restric-
tions on telephone sales solicitors, we apply the test for limitations
of commercial speech. We ask first whether the expression regu-
lated concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. If not, we must
inquire whether the state's interest in restricting the expression is
substantial, whether the limitations advance that interest, and
whether they are no greater than necessary to serve that interest.2
t Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.
' Pickett v Brown, 462 US 1, 9 (1983).
2 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v Public Service Commission, 447 US 557, 564
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Answering all three questions affirmatively means there is no con-
stitutional violation. If any of the three is answered negatively the
restriction violates the First Amendment.
There are, of course, literally dozens of similar tests. Viewed in
isolation, they yield a certain analytical satisfaction, even charm.
The rub comes when we look at a range of cases ostensibly decided
under the same test. Instead of finding a pattern of roughly similar
cases dealt with in the same way, we often see almost random vari-
ations. Thus, according to the Court's rulings, a state denies equal
protection to an illegitimate child if it requires that, in order for
him to inherit from his father by intestate succession, the parents
must have married and the father must acknowledge his pater-
nity.3 But a state does not deny equal protection to such a child if
it conditions his inheritance on obtaining a declaration of paternity
from a court during the father's lifetime.4 Likewise, a state violates
the First Amendment when it prohibits advertising that includes
the prices of prescription drugs.5 But Puerto Rico can constitution-
ally ban the advertising of legal gambling casinos to local
residents.'
These illustrations could be multiplied many times. Anyone
routinely examining the constitutional decisions of the Supreme
Court is bound to come to the conclusion that the Court has suc-
ceeded in creating clear and coherent frameworks for constitu-
tional adjudication in very few areas. The carefully designed tests
and criteria turn out to be almost infinitely manipulable. Both the
majority and the dissent can reasonably apply the same test and
reach flatly opposite results. In practice the neat crisp formulas
dissolve into doctrinal mush.
The reader of Constitutional Cultures7 finds that Robert
Nagel has made this distressing discovery. His book is, at least in
part, a response to it. The book exposes with a cold and penetrat-
ing intelligence the foibles and fallacies of modern constitutional
doctrine, which Nagel finds inconsistent, largely ineffective, and
often trivial.
(1980).
3 Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762 (1977).
" Lalli v Lalli, 439 US 259 (1978).
5 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
US 748 (1976).
8 Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 US 328 (1986).
7 Robert F. Nagel, Constitutional Cultures: The Mentality and Consequences of Judi-
cial Review (U Cal, 1989). All parenthetical page references in text and notes are to this
book.
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Much of modern academic writing on constitutional law is de-
voted to mere explaining and tinkering with the Court's doctrine.
Nagel's wholesale assault is an important and bracing exception.
Even more important, however, is Nagel's analysis of the underly-
ing reasons things have gone awry. In large part, it emerges, the
doctrinal confusion stems from the Supreme Court's simultaneous
response to two contradictory impulses. On the one hand, the
Court has set for itself the general task of improving, so far as pos-
sible by adjudication, the general welfare of society. Every case
presents an opportunity to get a little closer to some postulated
ideal. Nagel associates this mentality with what Michael Oakeshott
has called "rationalism"-the belief, in this context, that the
proper behavior of a public official consists entirely of solving
problems. (p 109)8 This strand has long been recognized in consti-
tutional jurisprudence. It has many labels: "instrumentalism,"9 the
pursuit of "progress," 10 and-less approvingly-"result-orienta-
tion."11
But this impulse to improve the general welfare is checked by
another impulse, necessitated by the Supreme Court's status as a
court of law. The Court senses the need to justify judicial actions
not just by their intrinsic goodness, but by their conformity with
some other external, legitimate standard.2 This latter aim, if taken
seriously, will inhibit the rationalist pursuit of the good society.
Any external standard that is prior to the matter to be considered
may, and inevitably sometimes will, fail to achieve the optimal so-
cial solution. No earnest social engineer can afford to have his
hands tied by a rule created in ignorance of the actual state of
society at the time the rule must be applied.
The Court has accommodated these conflicting needs (uncon-
sciously, no doubt) by fudging. Sometimes it has invoked a stan-
dard in the constitutional text that it redefines at a level so ab-
stract as to leave the Court more or less free to impose any
solution it thinks fit. (pp 110-11)13 Since such redefinition alone
' For a general discussion of rationalism, see pp 109-20.
9 See generally Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 1-
30 (Harvard, 1977).
" See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 13 (Harper
& Row, 1970).
11 This term, of course, has almost always been used pejoratively. See, for example,
Lewis v City of New Orleans, 415 US 130, 140 (1974) (Blackmun dissenting); Henry P.
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum L Rev 1, 3 n 18 (1983).
12 See United States v Butler, 297 US 1, 62 (1936); John Hart Ely, Democracy and
Distrust 43-72 (Harvard, 1980).
13 For example, the First Amendment's ban on the enactment of laws abridging the
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still leaves clear the Court's wide-ranging discretion, the Court fur-
ther translates these abstract values into the complicated and ap-
parently exact tests described above. The widespread employment
of such devices has led to the creation of what Nagel calls the "for-
mulaic constitution." (p 127)" 4 Under this regime the "doctrine
[appears to be] comprehensive and definitive. Only one answer can
emerge from the machine." (p 141) But, in fact, it "promise[s] clar-
ity or measurement where only judgment is possible." (p 139) We
are left with a constitutional law that invokes standards for deci-
sion that appear solid, impersonal and conclusive but that, in fact,
decide nothing.
The irony is that, according to Nagel, this elaborate camou-
flage serves no purpose. Not only does modern adjudication fail to
conform to some restraining and legitimate external standard, it
also fails to make the world into one that better reflects the values
that the Court wants to foster. Mainly this is because the core con-
stitutional ideals-freedom of expression, religious tolerance, racial
equality, and so forth-are already well entrenched in the political
and social ethos of society. They are, that is, already an essential
part of the "constitutional culture." (pp 45, 112) That culture is
defined by the uncoordinated decisions and actions of officials and
individuals. (pp 12-17, 23) The discrete aberrational acts that tend
to be the subject of constitutional litigation are unlikely to
threaten it. (p 70) Courts end up adjudicating only cases at the
disputed edges of the values invoked. They rarely find free expres-
sion threatened by the jailing of an unpopular newspaper editor.
Instead they define the reach of the First Amendment by deciding
whether a town may require a fence around a drive-in theater
where films depicting nudity are exhibited.15 Constitutional juris-
prudence becomes dominated by matters that are either trivial or
profoundly controversial. The result is that the basic values in-
voked are themselves brought into doubt or ridicule and society
ends up further from, not closer to, the ideal. Nagel concludes, for
example, that "the Court's program, taken as a whole, has done
great damage to the public understanding and appreciation of the
freedom of speech has sometimes been transformed into a general guarantee of a free flow of
information to the public, resulting, for instance, in a constitutionally compelled right of
access to criminal trials. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia, 448 US 555 (1980).
4 The "formulaic style" implies that "the advantages of realism can be successfully
combined with elements of formalism. The result is more conceptualistic than the 'grand
style' admired by the realists but more elaborate and sophisticated than the formalism that
they discredited." (p 130)
15 Erznoznik v City of Jacksonville, 422 US 205 (1975). (pp 45 and 112)
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principle of free speech by making it seem trivial, foreign, and un-
necessarily costly." (p 58)16
In addition to offering this acute diagnosis, Nagel offers some
suggestions for a more reasonable role for the judiciary in the con-
stitutional and political culture. In this, however, he bears some
resemblance to the "disappointed absolutist" described by H.L.A.
Hart who, having "found that rules are not all they would be in a
formalist's heaven ... expresses his disappointment by the denial
that there are, or can be, any rules. 17 The thrust of Nagel's analy-
sis is that courts should radically reduce the role they play in pub-
lic decision making. They should, of course, abandon their mission
to engineer a perfect society. But they should also withdraw from
their position as the principal and authoritative definers of the
meaning of the Constitution. (pp 25-26, 155) Nagel objects to the
idea that the Supreme Court has some monopoly on constitutional
interpretation. Rather, he notes, continuous and spontaneous in-
terpretations of the Constitution are made all the time, in varying
situations, by other public officials and by private parties.18 Every-
one concerned would be better off if the Court displayed'the mod-
esty appropriate to its position as one among many legitimate in-
terpreters. He counsels restraint and deference to the "customs
and mores of the times," and to "the judgments of the other
branches and levels of government." (p 25)
Beyond these general indications, however, it is not clear just
how Nagel thinks the courts should behave. In his conclusion he
declares that he has "no definite prescriptions for what the Court's
roles ought to be." (p 155) At another point he says that he does
not "intend to suggest that the courts can never have an important
role to play." (p 59) But the weight of his argument is that
courts-and especially the Supreme Court-should be doing less.
In particular, they should be doing less in the way of holding un-
constitutional the actions that are brought before them. (p 3)
In issuing this call, Nagel joins a long tradition. Perhaps the
classic articulation is James Bradley Thayer's. Thayer, starting
from rather different premises, concluded that a court should only
hold a statute invalid "when those who have the right to make
" The marginal importance of many litigated constitutional disputes is taken up in the
text following note 31.
" H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 135 (Oxford, 1961).
8 On the variety of constitutional interpretations from non-governmental sources, see
Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv L Rev 4, 26-35, 46-53 (1983);
Carol Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious
Authority, 26 J Family L 741, 766-69 (1987-88).
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laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear
one,-so clear that it is not open to rational question."19 Indeed,
like Nagel, Thayer based this view in part on the need for the
courts to respect the constitutional judgments of other official ac-
tors.20 The most influential modern argument for judicial modesty,
of course, is that of Alexander Bickel. Bickel argued that the Su-
preme Court should, where possible, decline to decide constitu-
tional cases. This would limit "the occasions of the Court's inter-
ventions, so that the times will be relatively few when the Court
injects itself decisively into the political process."'" Such restraint
would prevent the Court from arrogating to itself a decision mak-
ing power which, in our society, can rarely be legitimate out of the
hands of democratically-accountable officials. 2
The policy of judicial restraint certainly looks even better af-
ter Nagel has exposed the contradictions and failures of modern
constitutional doctrine. It is surprising, therefore, to find one
rather significant exception to Nagel's broad disapproval of judicial
intervention. Nagel approves of one of the most widely criticized
recent Supreme Court ventures, the short-lived reinvigoration of
the doctrine of state sovereignty in National League of Cities v
Usery. (p 61)23 In that case the Court held that the extension of
federal wage and hour legislation to employees of state govern-
ments contravened the Constitution's allocation of powers between
the state and federal governments.24
19 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 Harv L Rev 129, 144 (1893).
20 See id at 135.
21 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 128 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962). See
generally id at 11-98.
22 See id at16-23.
23 426 US 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority, 469 US 528, 531 (1985).
24 In accord with subsequent cases, see, for example, FERC v Mississippi, 456 US 742,
758 (1982), Nagel states that the holding of National League of Cities rests on a "violation
of the tenth amendment." (p 60) Many other commentators share this view. See for exam-
ple, Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30
UCLA L Rev 542, 545 (1983). I read Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion as resting on an
"affirmative limitation" implicit in the structure of the Constitution. He actually mentioned
the Tenth Amendment only once, citing Fry v United States, 421 US 542 (1975), as recog-
nizing the Tenth Amendment as "an express declaration of this limitation." 426 US at 842.
The implication is that the holding would be the same even if there were no Tenth Amend-
ment. See also Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federal-
ism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 Harv L Rev 1065, 1067-68
n 17 (1977).
Nagel's attachment to the holding in National League of Cities is entirely in keeping
with the preference for decentralized constitutional decision making, a major theme of his
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Nagel's endorsement of National League of Cities contrasts
with his skepticism concerning the Court's judgments defining and
enforcing claims of individual rights. He thus appears to present a
mirror image of the argument espoused by Jesse Choper that the
Court should abstain from invalidating government actions based
on federalism and separation of powers for the very purpose of
preserving its ability successfully to develop and apply a constitu-
tional jurisprudence of individual rights. 5 Nagel suggests that the
Court and constitutional scholars, Choper included, have been un-
duly attached to vigorous judicial enforcement of the constitu-
tional protection of rights and so have underappreciated the im-
portance of the structural values of the Constitution. (pp 62-68)26
Yet Nagel does not argue for an active and rigorous judicial
application of federalism and separation of powers principles. In-
deed, Nagel dislikes some of the Court's other efforts on behalf of
state autonomy. He disapproves of its attempt to develop some
formulaic definition of the power granted to Congress to regulate
commerce. (p 72) He finds objectionable the equally formulaic ap-
proach to setting limits on state activities based on the negative
implications of the commerce power. (pp 146-47) Likewise, he crit-
icizes the cases following and limiting National League of Cities
that purported to reaffirm its basic themes, not so much for their
holdings, as for translating its result into a technical multi-prong
test. (pp 136-37)
Instead, the decision in National League of Cities appeals to
Nagel because it touches base with the essential aspects of federal-
ism without reducing it to a rule. Indeed, for Nagel, the actual re-
sult in the case is not very important. Another case might have
even better illustrated the long-neglected "theory of federalism."
(p 80) That's the most we can expect from the Court-to "illus-
trate" principles, to "richly [convey] a central lesson about our
constitutional system," to "shape attitudes and comprehension [so
as to be] educative." (pp 80-81) Nagel praises the opinion in Na-
tional League of Cities for its "tentative and uncompleted qual-
ity," its "unusual departure from the formulaic style" and its "un-
structured, but suggestive, examples, analogies, contrasts, and
book.
25 Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 71-379 (U Chi-
cago, 1980).
2, This point did seem to be central to his earlier discussion of National League of
Cities, on which the relevant chapter is based. See Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Funda-
mental Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 S Ct Rev 81.
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phrases." -(p 135) Such an approach, he claims, is in fact truer to
the Constitution, which contains unresolved questions and deliber-
ate ambiguities. (pp 80-81) The Court should not replace the raw
and unfinished values of the Constitution with a closed code of
rules. It should only raise doubts, suggest, and remind.
Nagel praises the same qualities in Brown v Board of Educa-
tion." For him, that decision need not be justified as the applica-
tion of a static rule of equality embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Rather, like National League of Cities, Brown was
only a confirmation and reminder of a constitutional value-here
"equal protection"-as (Nagel argues) it had developed and was
widely held in the society. Such a reminder was an appropriate re-
sponse to racial segregation, a deviant regional departure from the
societal standard. (pp 4-5) Brown thus exemplifies for Nagel "a
more usual role for the courts . . .to restrain departures from a
core of settled meaning-settled both by the clear sense and his-
tory of the Constitution and by apparent public understandings."
(p 24)
This mnemonic function typifies the judicial approach that
Nagel prefers. He contrasts it with the magisterial and unyielding
style prevailing in the judgments of the modern Supreme Court.
Nagel proposes, instead, a judiciary that is merely one participant
in, and in some cases a facilitator of, the cultural process that gives
meaning to constitutional values. The modern "formulaic" opin-
ions cut off that process by claiming a (specious) certainty and
comprehensiveness. (p 141) Rather than "disqualify" the reader, a
court should attempt to establish with that reader a "common voli-
tion" by appealing to a shared and familiar constitutional experi-
ence. (pp 137-47)28
Given this outlook, it is not surprising that Nagel proposes no
new and better ways for the courts to interpret the constitutional
text. Nagel's model of an ideal constitutional environment is not
merely inconsistent with the mechanical, but substantively empty,
347 US 483 (1954).
Besides the judgments in Brown and National League of Cities, Nagel finds much to
admire in Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 US 715 (1961), where the Court
found that racial discrimination by a privately operated restaurant, located in space leased
in a municipally owned and operated building, was "state action" violating the Fourteenth
Amendment. Nagel describes this as a case "that uses no principles or rules." (p 143)
Rather, the Court explained in its opinion that the presence of state action "can be deter-
mined only in the framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances present." 365 US at 726.
(p 144) Nagel feels that Burton's influence in subsequent cases is due to an "attention to
particularized facts Ithat] was rich and emphatic, certainly more so than a mechanically
stated rule." (p 144)
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formulas of the modern Supreme Court; it is fundamentally at
odds with formulas of any kind. Formulas with bite, formulas that
would not be as vulnerable to manipulation, would just as effec-
tively shut out alternative understandings of the Constitution
originating outside the judiciary. His preferences are strikingly
summarized in the following terms:
A successful accommodation of realism and formalism, if it is
possible, would require a style of communication far different
from the formulaic style. Perversely, the task would some-
times require imperfection-evocation, incompleteness, tenta-
tiveness, and even a willingness not to explain. (p 131)
This approach is fundamentally unsympathetic to the idea of
the Constitution as supreme law. That understanding supposes
that the constitutional text consists of a set of static rules, created
at discrete moments, that set the outer limits to the lawful use of
governmental power. The chief virtue of a constitutional regime, so
conceived, is the clarity and stability it creates for people who need
to plan their lives without fear of public interference. Quite plainly
it is a prerequisite of such an arrangement that one be able to
trace a fairly clear line between the constitutional and the
unconstitutional.29
Nagel is quite right that modern constitutional jurisprudence
hasn't come close to achieving the goals associated with the rule of
law. The modern constitutional tests he has dissected and exposed
with such acuity have, if anything, subverted those values by creat-
ing a constitutional law devoid of the clarity and predictability
that are critical to their realization. Stripped of much of their doc-
trinal paraphernalia, those tests reduce to varieties of "balancing."
The value protected by the constitutional provision invoked is
weighed against the interest of the state in taking the challenged
action. 0
Given the conflicting impulses besetting courts it is not sur-
prising that their responses should take this form. The Constitu-
tion singles out for special treatment a few human activities and
interests. The modern state is naturally concerned with a far wider
range of needs and goals. A court bent on improving the world "in
29 Nagel recognizes the virtue of clarity in constitutional law. (p 59)
30 Nagel himself appears to think "balancing" is a judicial technique distinct from the
"formulas" that are the main object of his criticism. (p 148) On balancing, see generally T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L J 943 (1987).
Aleinikoff concludes that the employment of balancing "is transforming constitutional dis-
course into a general discussion of the reasonableness of governmental conduct." Id at 987.
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general" can't do a very good job if it only considers the values
thought important by a handful of people two hundred years ago.
The device of balancing admits into a court's consideration the
constitutional values and all the other values that have become im-
portant in modern society. By manipulating the verbal formulas it
employs, the Supreme Court can, in every instance, attempt to ar-
rive at an outcome that will yield the maximum net advantage to
society. Moreover, since the exact interests in each case will be
slightly different, a court can appear to be consistent and still al-
ways come to the "optimal" result. This form of adjudication
seems, especially after the rejection of Robert Bork as a Supreme
Court nominee, to be the model for sensitive judicial behavior."
But, as Nagel's analysis reveals, its ad hoc quality is inconsistent
with the stability and legitimacy that are vital to a constitutional
rule of law.
Nagel's view of the proper role of the judiciary, however, is
troubling on exactly the same grounds. Although he argues that
leaving the Constitution "uninterpreted" will, in fact, lead to a
more stable meaning (pp 18-22), the kind of minimalist adjudica-
tion he suggests will deprive individuals of opportunities to test
the outer limits of constitutional rules. But the virtues of constitu-
tional government consist precisely in the ability to liquidate those
limits. Our regard for the value of free speech may somehow be
Si This understanding is evident in the remarks of many of the senators who voted
against confirming Bork's appointment. See, for example, remarks of Senator Dodd, 100th
Cong, 1st Sess (Oct 23, 1987), in 133 Cong Rec S14959 (Bork "looks for bright line answers
as if he was solving a mathematical problem, and seems uncomfortable making judgments
and distinctions that reflect the fundamental traditions and ideals of our people.... [He]
fails to recognize the expansive and evolving nature of our rights and liberties."); id at
S14985 (remarks of Senator Lautenberg) ("[T]he hallmark of our Constitution and our sys-
tem of laws has been its flexibility, its vitality, its ability to adapt to changing times and
expanding conceptions of liberty."); and id at S14923 (remarks of Sen. Levin) (Bork's pref-
erence for "these 'bright lines' [has] tended to blind him to the human consequences of his
logical constructs. In the words of former Judge Shirley Hufstedler, Judge Bork has been
marked by a determination 'to develop constitutional litmus tests' so he can 'avoid having to
confront the grief and untidiness of the human condition.' ") See also Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Constitution Is Not "Hard Law" The Bork Rejection and the Future of Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence, 6 Const Comm 29 (1989).
The same conclusions arise from the panegyrics for Justice Powell on his retirement.
His case-by-case approach was consistently lauded. See generally A Tribute to Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 Harv L Rev 395 (1986) (collection of untitled essays by named
authors). See specifically Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 101 Harv L Rev 399, 401 (like Aristotle,
Powell "believed that the right actions in particular cases were prior to the principles that
would explain their rightness."); Gerald Gunther, 101 Harv L Rev 409, 411 (Powell followed
"the model of the judge committed to the fairminded resolution of particular cases."); and
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, 101 Harv L Rev 417, 420 (For Powell "[t]he universe of each case
was bounded by the record; what mattered most were facts.").
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more secure if we never push it to extremes. But that value is less
useful to people trying to plan their lives if they are unable to fore-
cast, with some assurance, the circumstances in which the govern-
ment may and may not penalize their expression.
Nagel dislikes judicial rhetoric that tries to foreclose further
consideration of the constitutional issue by other actors in society.
His attitude is, therefore, uncongenial to the formation of definite
rules.2 Under his preferred method, constitutional law is not the
application and elaboration of a collection of superior legal rules
defining and restraining the State. Rather, it begins to resemble
constitutional law in the English sense, a complex of statutes, char-
ters, conventions and traditions, written and unwritten, that per-
tain to the relations between government and individuals. It is
open-ended, always open to revision from day to day and year to
year. And it is the product of many sources-legislatures, courts,
and other government actors-emerging from a multitude of unco-
ordinated actions.33 This is in sharp contrast to the traditional
American idea of a constitution that is not simply about the extent
of public power but, is, itself, the source of, and ultimate con-
straint on, public power.
31 He writes:
As important as the words [of constitutional decisions] is the structure of the formulae.
Their design suggests that all the relevant issues have been identified, separated, and
answered. The doctrine is comprehensive and definitive. Only one answer can emerge
from the machine. The vitriolic exchanges among the Justices that are becoming cus-
tomary are not merely evidence of ideological cleavages. They result from the same
excessive pursuit of certainty that is reflected in the form of modern doctrine. When
only one answer is possible, disagreement even among members of the Court is treated
as a sign of irresponsibility or obduracy. A fortiori, the formulaic style forecloses inde-
pendent judgment by the wider publics that are affected by the decisions but that have
no special claims to understanding or authority. (p 141)
See also Nagel's defense of Justice Roberts' famous dictum in United States v Butler, 297
US 1, 62 (1936), stating that a court's duty is merely to "lay the article of the Constitution
which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter
squares with the former." This assertion is usually condemned as naive and mindless for-
malism. See Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 90-91 (cited in note 21). Nagel notes
that Justice Roberts conceded that "'[a]ll the Court does, or can do, is to announce its
considered judgment upon the question.'" This formulation concedes the obvious impossi-
bility of executing the judicial duty by locating the single correct answer. (p 132)
11 See John Alder, Constitutional and Administrative Law 22-34 (MacMillan, 1989);
and E.C.S. Wade and A.W. Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative Law 12-35 (Long-
man, 10th ed 1985). The English legal system does place ultimate decision making authority
in the Queen-in-Parliament. See Alder, Constitutional and Administrative Law at 63-67. In
that respect it provides a more defined system of legal power than Nagel's, which posits no
hierarchy among official decision makers and gives standing as well to private judgments.
See text at note 43.
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Nagel makes occasional and sometimes unexplained references
to the constraining power of the constitutional text. Thus he re-
gards Brown as an appropriate invocation of the "clear sense and
history of the Constitution." (p 24) He argues that the text itself,
without distorting interpretations, is a source of stable constitu-
tional values. (pp 18-22) And he decries the judicial substitution of
abstract values for the specific rules of the constitutional text.
(pp 110-11) (Although by worrying about whether the Supreme
Court has really promoted free expression and tolerance in apply-
ing the First Amendment, Nagel implicitly concedes the relevance
of such abstract goods to the evaluation of judicial performance.)
(pp 27-59) But these references constitute a distinctly secondary
theme. They are pretty much swamped by his more obvious con-
cern that constitutional meanings develop out of a continuing and
largely undefined constitutional discourse. (pp 12-17)
There is a remarkable absence in Constitutional Cultures. It
omits one topic that is surely expected in any book on American
judicial review-an extended consideration of Marbury
v Madison34 and Chief Justice Marshall's argument that judicial
review follows inevitably from the ordinary duty of a court. That
decision has, in the past, provided a critical subject for such advo-
cates of a restrained judicial role as James Bradley Thayer,
Learned Hand,3 6 and Alexander Bickel.37 Strangely, the case ap-
pears only twice in Nagel's book. Early in the text he notes its sup-
position that constitutional meaning is meant to be permanent.
(p 6) More significantly, a quotation from Marbury appears as an
epigraph to the book, paired with another from James Boyd
White. The two quotations are important enough in illustrating
the thrust of Nagel's approach to justify reproducing them. First,
Marshall in Marbury:
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The
constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable
by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative
acts. (p vii) 38
And White:
Behind all the theoretical talk of government and legitimacy,
behind the systems and projects, behind even the forms of
5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
35 See Thayer, 7 Harv L Rev at 139 (cited in note 19).
11 Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 6-16 (Harvard, 1958).
31 See Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 114-33 (cited in note 21).
31 Marbury, 5 US (1 Cranch) at 176.
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government itself, there is a culture, a living organization of
mankind, upon which all the talk of system and mechanism
depends, both for its intelligibility and for its effects .... In
all its complexity and interconnectedness it is our substantive
and actual constitution. (p vii)39
Here are two sharply contrasting views of the Constitution. In
the first the Constitution is a set of supreme rules of law. (Mar-
shall never even considers the possibility that the Constitution is
no kind of law at all.) From this premise the idea of judicial review
follows as an attempt to discover the meaning of those rules and to
apply them to the cases before the courts. In the second the Con-
stitution is a multifarious and changing amalgam of practices, in-
stitutions, and attitudes. No single judgment on contested acts of
government can be derived from it, and a form of judicial review
that tries to do so is futile and misguided."0
One has little doubt, after reading Constitutional Cultures,
which of these views Nagel favors. His preference for a minimalist
version of judicial review follows from his vision of the Constitu-
tion as something other than law in the sense of rules applicable by
courts. The adoption of his view would alleviate some of the em-
barrassments of constitutional adjudication, but it would do so at
the cost of abandoning the effort to secure the clarity and stability
we seek in a rule of law. A regime characterized by the rule of law
requires a human agency to apply the prior rules to the matters
they were meant to govern. But it must be the abstract rules and
not the human agents that decide those matters. Similarly, and
particularly pertinent here, those agents must not be allowed to
pass over any controversy governed by the constitutional rules.
Otherwise the discretion that the rules are to control is reintro-
duced in the decision whether to apply the rules at all. So a corol-
lary to Marshall's holding in Marbury that the Constitution is en-
" Quoting James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning 226-27 (U Chicago,
1984).
40 This is also the constitution of Karl Llewellyn. See K. N. Llewellyn, The Constitu-
tion as an Institution, 34 Colum L Rev 1, 39-40 (1934). For a criticism of scholarship advo-
cating judicial participation in a "dialogue" to develop constitutional meaning, see Earl M.
Maltz, The Supreme Court and the Quality of Political Dialogue, 5 Const Comm 375
(1988).
As I have indicated, see text at notes 33-34, Nagel makes occasional reference to some
constraining influence from the constitutional text. But the thrust of his argument is that
courts, as merely one participant in constitutional discourse, ought not to see their duty as
immediately applying their best understanding of the text to the controversies brought
before them.
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forceable law is his dictum in Cohens v Virginia on the duty of
courts to adjudicate:
With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may
be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one
or the other would be treason to the constitution.41
Rule-governed adjudication42 is, therefore, an alternative both
to the "rationalist" tendency of modern adjudication and to the
kind of abstention that Nagel advocates. Under the constraint of
rules courts do not seek to improve the world in a general way. Nor
do they feel obliged to foster the set of values they find underlying
the constitutional text. Rather, the judges are to apply a set of
rules, created and committed to writing at a particular historical
moment. The values those rules represent are promoted only as an
incident of applying the rules. The rules themselves provide suffi-
cient reasons for action.43
Whether a society is better off assigning only this rule-applica-
tion role to the judiciary is clearly a contestable political question.
To so limit the judicial function is to abandon the effort, en-
couraged by most commentators, to employ the judiciary to pro-
mote the unlimited moral improvement of society. It is also to
deny the courts the opportunity to assume the even more modest
role that Nagel suggests. In his ideal system, the judiciary is
merely one contributor to the inexact process of defining constitu-
tional meaning. His approach reduces-in a way mandatory rule
application does not-the risk of drawing judges into the doctrinal
quagmire that is so effectively criticized in Constitutional Cul-
tures. Whether rule-governed adjudication would, in fact, provide
much in the way of clarity and predictability, and what we would
lose by foregoing social progress or by warping our social values,
are basically empirical questions and exceptionally uncertain
ones.44 And whether those benefits of rule-based adjudication,
Cohens v Virginia, 19 US 264, 404, 6 Wheat 120, 181 (1821).
42 This kind of adjudication is also (usually pejoratively) called formalism. For an intel-
ligent discussion of it see Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L J 509 (1988).
"' See Larry Alexander, The Constitution As Law, 6 Const Comm 103 (1989); Schauer,
97 Yale L J at 537 (cited in note 42). As to the capacity of constitutional rules to restrain,
see Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw U L Rev 226 (1988).
"4 Nagel argues that the judicial process is inherently incapable of achieving any signifi-
cant measure of certainty in the elaboration of constitutional rules. He notes especially the
fact that these matters are resolved in a context of litigation where dispute and uncertainty
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however we estimate them, are worth the losses, however mea-
sured, is a moral-political question that will depend on relative
judgments of what is important in ordering our social existence.
To the extent we regard the virtues of the rule of law as cru-
cial in defining the nature of constitutional adjudication, we might
criticize the modern constitutional decisions not because they em-
ploy formulas, but because they employ the wrong formulas. Those
formulas are not tied to the norms of the written Constitution6
and, because they are so manipulable, they fail to provide serious
restraints. The alternative suggested in Constitutional Cultures,
however, also fails to bring us closer to a regime of legal rule, as it
denies the possibility of authoritatively settling the limits the Con-
stitution places on public action. What Nagel proposes amounts to
a kind of laissez-faire constitutionalism: "You have your meaning.
I have mine. The Court has its." With no definitive decision
maker, no one's meaning has any higher standing than another's.
In such circumstances there is no way, in the end, to distinguish
between the authorized and the impermissible for government or
for individuals. That comes down to having no constitutional rules
at all, just a range of constitutional ideas. Perhaps individuals,
groups, and governments really can coexist with the sole security
of mutual good will and self-restraint. But that is a risky proposi-
tion-one our society seems to have rejected in seeking to establish
a rule of law. Certainly there are attractions as well as risks in the
kind of hopeful cooperative project of value formation and harmo-
nization that Nagel envisions. But we could have that kind of con-
stitutional culture with no Constitution at all.
are inevitable. (p 11) But, at least in the sense of providing notice as to the limits of permis-
sible government behavior, it is hard to believe that ongoing judicial rule application that is
accompanied by explicit verbal justification does not provide more in the way of stability
than the unstructured constitutional environment Nagel proposes. These judgments are al-
ways comparative.
"5 I pass over the question of whether those norms are to be understood in the manner
intended by their enactors or in some standard sense of their language. I have explained
why I find the former more consistent with the idea of the Constitution as law in Richard S.
Kay, Original Intentions, Standard Meanings and the Legal Character of the Constitution,
6 Const Comm 39 (1989). A contrary view is expressed in Frederick Schauer, An Essay on
Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L Rev 797, 809-12 (1982). Supreme Court doctrine sig-
nificantly departs from the constitutional rules in either sense. And although Nagel indi-
cates that he favors adherence to the rules of the text in some "uninterpreted" form (p 24),
his preference for allowing meaning to be settled by an evolving and ill-defined consensus,
with only rare judicial intervention, would allow substantial deviation in practice from ei-
ther conception of the rules.
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